Library:25 Years of Struggle

25 Years of Struggle
Manuel Pérez, author.
Written by	Manuel Pérez
Written in	1989
Source	Memoirs - Manuel Pérez Martínez

25 Years of Struggle

Manuel Pérez
1989

Prensa Colombia Viva: On July 4, 1964, the revolutionary organization National Liberation Army (ELN) was created; today, the Camilist Union National Liberation Army (UCELN) celebrates its 25th anniversary. For this occasion, the Colombia Viva Press Agency interviewed the premier leader of this organization, comrade Manuel Pérez Martínez. Two main topics were briefly addressed: first, the main experiences of these 25 years of combat, and second, the ELN's vision of the situation in Colombia in mid-1989.

I. UC-ELN

PCV: Comrade, if we were to compare the life of the organization to that of a person, how many stages do you think it has gone through during these 25 years, and in which stage is it today?

Manuel: In these 25 years, I would say that it has gone through three stages.

The first stage runs from its emergence in 1964 to 1973, which we would call the infancy stage; where its first steps are taken, both in its political dynamics and in its military activity.

The second stage, which we could call youth, is when many questions arise, many concerns must be resolved, and many challenges are faced regarding the development of its dynamics. We consider this the crisis stage, from 1973 to 1980; during which a series of internal questions arise, critical analysis of development takes place, and there is a search for both mass work and political struggle, as well as renewal in terms of military activity.

And finally, we would talk about the third stage, in which maturity begins, just as in the physical development of a person, maturity begins at 20 or 25 years old; we consider this moment as one of growth, where we develop both numerically and in our military activity, in the political struggle, and in mass dynamics. But that doesn't mean we can't acknowledge that there are aspects of its development that still need to mature in order to reach full maturity.

We would highlight three fundamental aspects that need further attention:
The first, regarding its connection with the people, which should lead to a more dynamic mass struggle; one of mobilization and organization.
The second aspect would be to continue deepening our understanding of how to manage the resources of the new power that is emerging.
And the third aspect would be to address the deeply felt need for cadre training, so that they can become qualified and, at the same time, to develop a larger number of them.

PCV: It is said that during the so-called crisis, the Organization was on the verge of collapse. What prevented this, and do you believe it is now at a stage of development where it will no longer be threatened with extinction?

Manuel: Regarding why it didn't collapse at that time, I would say there were three fundamental factors: the first factor, because there was a minimum level of support among the people and at the same time great sympathy in broad sectors of the population. Let's not forget the actions of the ELN during that period, its military actions, their great political impact, the participation of Camilo, etc. As a second factor, there was a political trajectory in the confrontation with the enemy and its expression of radicalism, which was a manifestation of the entire political foundation that the National Liberation Army was building throughout its political-military journey.

And as a third factor, there were cadres deeply committed to the project in its entirety. For the future, following the development of these factors and considering their current state, we can say that the Camilist Union - National Liberation Army today has greater development and roots among the people, in its mass organizations; it has been able to generate and organize large mobilizations and combative struggles, it has a longer history of struggle, precisely forged in the confrontation with the enemy and in different experiences in military activity, mass struggle, and political struggle.

On the other hand, it has a larger number of more qualified cadres, and in that sense, I say that it is more difficult for the Camilist Union - National Liberation Army to reach a situation of crisis leading to its extinction; this does not mean that we should not anticipate difficult moments, because the revolutionary organization is an instrument that must always be ready for the people to carry out the revolution. And it must be constantly reviewed to determine the extent of its thirst for power, the aspects that are not sufficiently developed, the gaps in its policies, the lack of progress in its training or military activities, and the lack of connection with the broad masses of the entire country. In this sense, the vanguard must always be a malleable instrument so that it can serve as a tool for the revolution. In these aspects, further development is still needed within the UCELN.

II. ABOUT CAMILO

PCV: In the first stage of the ELN's existence, the revolutionary priest Camilo Torres Restrepo, upon founding the United Front in 1965, encountered the entire Colombian left of that time; but when he chose to leave the priesthood, he requested to join the ELN. Why do you think Camilo made this decision, knowing that there were many other paths on the left in Colombia to choose from?

Manuel: Camilo could not truly be understood as a whole without connecting him to the ELN, just as it would be very difficult to explain and fully understand the ELN without Camilo.

Furthermore, Camilo marks the participation of Christians in the Colombian revolution, also serving as an example for the Latin American revolution and for the world. He was accepted by the organization because it, in turn, represented a more open ideological current than the other Marxist organizations, regarding the participation of revolutionary Christians. The most striking aspect of this phenomenon is that it occurred practically from the beginning of the Organization, since Camilo joined from the outset in 1965.

Thus, we can say that both in Camilo and in the Organization, there is a coincidence, in part in the radicalism in the struggle against the class enemy, but at the same time there is a great flexibility in both Camilo and the Organization, in their ideas.

PCV: After Camilo joined the ELN guerrilla in October 1965, the United Front that he formed began to decline, it began a process of dispersion; it is a widespread assertion that the United Front would not have continued to project itself as a mass political alternative to the oligarchy at that time, and that this is because the ELN did not sufficiently value this type of connection with the people. Furthermore, the fact that the ELN was developing a bureaucratic organizational structure, isolated from the masses, is logically referring to the ELN's early stages. Could we say today that the ELN has already overcome this initial phase, or what aspects of it still remain?

Manuel: Indeed, there was a major review and profound changes in this regard on the part of the Organization. It was acknowledged that there had been a neglect of rooting the Organization in the people and of developing organizational forms for mobilization and struggle; this was greatly emphasized in the changes that the Organization began to implement, especially based on the lessons learned from Anorí, when the causes of this setback were analyzed.

There, we saw that the fundamental cause lay in the lack of roots among the people and therefore the lack of stability of the Organization, in terms of building and developing a mass base. The aforementioned reason explains the lack of recognition of the United Front, but logically, this is not the only reason.

PCV: Another advantage of this revolutionary movement originating from the ELN is the capacity it has acquired in conducting guerrilla warfare, but it also has shortcomings that are applicable to all Colombian guerrilla groups. For example, it is said that the guerrillas have not been able to defeat the government army, but neither has the government army been able to defeat the guerrillas; in other words, there is a certain stalemate. Could we say that a lack of will to power is evident in this form of struggle?

Manuel: Indeed, guerrilla warfare, as a tool or method of combat, can only be understood within the context of the will to power, although unfortunately there have been times when it has lacked this.

Today we are clearer about how to develop it; we see how guerrilla warfare must be linked to new developments such as the Revolutionary Army Units, the organization of the people into militias, and also linked to the political conditions of each specific moment, as a fundamental element in the analysis of the state of war in Colombia and the participation that the guerrillas are having in its development.

At this moment, we must examine and analyze the will to power that the guerrilla organizations are expressing in their political and military actions.

III. ABOUT THE MERGE

PCV: When MIR Patria Libre and the ELN merged, the Camilist Union National Liberation Army emerged in June 1987. As a result, what changes has the revolutionary force for which you are the political leader experienced?

Manuel: We could summarize the political balance, which is primarily expressed in the north of the country, where there is an accumulation of cadres, revolutionary experience, both political and military, and a political base that gives a new dimension to the project and the possibilities for the advancement of the revolution.

"MERGER AGREEMENT

We unite for Colombia, for its men and women, so that the freedom of our homeland may flourish. We unite so that life, full life, woven with dreams and bread, may forever exist on Latin American soil. We unite so that the destinies of our people will no longer be decided under another sky, by men who both use and despise us. We unite to set an example for our brothers and sisters, invoking the Thought of Camilo and opening paths of hope."

PCV: To conclude this first part regarding the history of the Organization, I would like you to summarize the particular elements that distinguish the UCELN from other vanguard organizations.

Manuel: I would point out seven aspects that are specific to the UCELN and which, in fact, have been expressed to us several times by other people and other organizations.

It has been said that we are the tough ones, and surely we are the tough ones in the confrontation, but at the same time we consider ourselves flexible in our ideas. Although we are tough in combat, we have been able to merge without creating divisions and to creatively adapt Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of Latin America. The persistence in armed struggle and in the struggle outside of institutions has led precisely to the search for the materialization of popular power as an alternative that emerges outside of institutions and raises alternatives of power from the popular masses, from their expressions of struggle and mobilization.

IV. UNITY AND THE SEVEN PECULIARITIES

PCV:To conclude this first part concerning the history of the Organization, I would like you to summarize the particular elements that distinguish UCELN from other vanguard organizations?

Manuel: I would point out seven aspects that are specific to UCELN and that, in fact, have been expressed to us several times by other people and other organizations.

It has been said that we are the tough ones, and we are certainly the tough ones in confrontation, but at the same time we consider ourselves flexible in our ideas. Although we are tough in combat, we have been able to merge without creating divisions and to creatively adapt Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of Latin America.

The persistence in armed struggle and in the struggle outside of institutions, which has precisely led to the search for the materialization of popular power as an alternative that emerges from outside the institutional framework and raises alternatives of power from the popular masses, from their expressions of struggle and mobilization.

The simultaneous and permanent development of the political and military aspects, let's say, as the two sides of the same coin.

Unitary work, with the vision that there are several vanguard organizations, several experiences that complement and teach each other, and different sectors of the country where each organization is more developed. We call all of this the concept of Collective Vanguard, which is why we say that it can have its practical outcome, either in the development of mergers, as occurred in the emergence of UCELN, or also in the formation of revolutionary fronts or National Liberation Fronts.

We frame ourselves as a current of thought in the search for Latin American identity; which has always meant that we have had to rely on our own efforts for development, since we have not had a direct relationship with international ideological or political currents that have had, in a certain way, an organic structure.

Having introduced the debate on the defense of our national sovereignty through our political and military actions.

The participation of revolutionary Christians in the Organization.

PCV: Turning to the current situation in Colombia, we would like to know: why, at this moment, does the UCELN, unlike the Communist Party (PC) and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCCML), not agree with prioritizing the political struggle to confront the counter-insurgency offensive being carried out by the Barco government?

Manuel: In the current situation we are experiencing, we establish the military struggle as the main one, of course, along with political denunciation. We establish it this way because we are aware that the government is exerting great military pressure in various ways, on the one hand, against the mass movement, through generalized repression and dirty war, and on the other hand, against the peasant areas, which it terrorizes with bombings and attacks of all kinds against the population.

At the same time, we see that the mass movement, which developed great struggles last year, is currently undergoing a retreat. Therefore, we believe that we cannot let this situation pass without any kind of response, on the one hand, to help with denunciation, to motivate and boost the morale of the people's struggles, and to give rise to different expressions of struggle where the people can find new paths, including armed response and defense. On the other hand, we believe that we must be very careful not to encroach on the spaces that belong to the masses.

We see that this is a specific moment in the current situation, considering that the military struggle will not always prevail over the political struggle. For this moment, the fundamental issue is that we have a difference with the other organizations on how to confront the entire counter-insurgency onslaught of the regime against the people and against the revolutionary organizations; that is why the other organizations confront it with a truce and other measures, and we confront it from a military perspective and with political denunciation. With this, we respond to the declaration of war, through the high military command.

PCV: Since the UCELN is a member of the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Committee -CGSB-, this contrasts with the majority of the coordinating committee members who are implementing a unilateral ceasefire, while the UCELN is carrying out a political-military campaign that began in April of this year. Is this evidence of the aforementioned divergence?

Manuel: It is precisely due to the different assessment of the proposals that are being put forward in the country, and the content that these proposals for dialogue and demands for a truce have taken on; this is what they have called peace proposals. On the one hand, Barco's proposal is a proposal for militarily defeated organizations, because it initially proposes a ceasefire and demonstrating a willingness to demobilize as a precondition for initiating dialogue; that is, these are very demanding requirements of good faith for the revolutionary organizations.

In contrast, we see that the government does not assume any commitment regarding the army ceasing its operations, ceasing to grow, ceasing to modernize and acquire more weapons in all areas, and much less, the paralysis of the actions of the paramilitary groups, which would be the minimum.

On the contrary, a number of massacres and murders are taking place. These days, even, the government says it is attacking the paramilitaries, while it releases a major drug trafficker - the son of Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha. We see, then, the contrast: while it demands great demonstrations of good faith from the revolutionary movement, the government does not feel obligated to give any proof of "good will"; it is a very arrogant attitude. On the other hand, the proposal by social-conservative Senator Álvaro Leyva Durán for "Peace" is part of the social-conservative party's strategy for the presidential elections, which we respect as a campaign tactic of the social-conservative movement, but we know beforehand that it is not the real path to achieving peace. From this point of view, these truce and dialogue processes will not change the government's counterinsurgency policy in any way, nor will they improve the living conditions of the people.

PCV: But the war being waged today in Colombia is not only a war between the dominant class and the insurgent forces, but there are also other types of confrontations, and this became even more evident after the attack that drug traffickers and paramilitaries carried out against General Miguel Maza Márquez—Director of the DAS (Administrative Department of Security). Moreover, a Bogotá newspaper has said that there is an alliance between the DAS and the Colombian left against the military, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers. If this is true, would we be witnessing a fundamental contradiction among the Colombian dominant classes, expressed through the confrontation between these state institutions?

Manuel: Yes, what happens is that there is no alliance between the DAS and the Left, because the DAS is a state intelligence agency that is heavily involved in the fight against the insurgency. Now, the Americans do have a great interest in the attack on Colombian drug trafficking, in which General Maza Márquez is very much in tune with them, and is very much in agreement with imperialist interests.

In this fight against drug trafficking, in which Maza Márquez and part of the government are aligned, they clash with paramilitaries and military figures like General Farouk Yanine Díaz and his entire group who lead the battalions in the Middle Magdalena and the Northeast of the country, although they are not the only ones. It is worth remembering that this alliance of drug traffickers and the military was initiated by Farouk Yanine Díaz when he created the MAS (Death to Kidnappers) in the Middle Magdalena, to defend the interests of the Ochoa family.

PCV: Since we are talking about coincidences, could it be said that the proposals made by former President López Michelsen on the humanization of the war and the proposals of the UCELN on the same subject suggest that conversations are being held with sectors of the dominant classes in order to achieve these goals of making the war less barbaric?

Manuel: Indeed, regarding the humanization of the war, we are willing to talk with sectors of the bourgeoisie who are interested in the Geneva Conventions and, logically, above all, in their implementation, just as we are also willing to fight against those sectors of the bourgeoisie that are promoting the counterinsurgency war. That is why we are implementing campaigns to wage the war and at the same time to discuss the humanization of the conflict. Naturally, we are willing to talk with anyone who wants to talk with us, with anyone who is interested in the subject, provided they understand that we are speaking from opposing sides in this great effort to humanize the war.

By humanizing the war, we mean the following specific things:

Reaching agreements where the enemy commits to not attacking the civilian population.

Achieving an agreement on respect for prisoners of war.

Regulating the types of weapons used in the confrontation.

PCV: But, does a proposal for the humanization of war have a future in such a violent country, especially since it has drawn criticism from several directions: one, for example, argues that it would indefinitely prolong the conflict, and the other suggests that the proposal means gradually dismantling the armed conflict?

Manuel: I believe that the work on the humanization of war has a great future because it is based on realism. In our country, a large-scale internal conflict is unfolding—a civil war; the point is that by talking about the humanization of war, we acknowledge that we have a civil war; the problem is not whether or not this war ends, or whether it ends sooner or later, the important thing is that it develops within certain boundaries, within limits that prevent bloodshed for the civilian population, so that they do not have to suffer a bloodbath of millions of their inhabitants, and also that acts of barbarity are not carried out against wounded or detained combatants. In other words, we consider it necessary to reach agreements on the conditions for waging war.

We therefore propose the humanization of war not as a mere stratagem to be recognized as a belligerent force. Our great concern stems from a revolutionary ethical stance that defends humanity, the entire population, the vast majority of the country, and that defends humanitarian interests as central concerns of society.

PCV: This war is also characterized by the abundant use of sabotage, and the UCELN in particular is distinguished by this. Recently, the U.S. State Department, which keeps track of attacks carried out against its interests, stated in its April 13 report of this year that Colombia is where they receive the most attacks in the world and that the organization that attacks the most is the UCELN. This report states verbatim:

"The ELN has made no secret of its intention to force foreign companies to leave the country."

This same phrase is repeated in Colombia, and in addition to the ELN having a certain hatred of foreigners, they are also labeled as crazy and insane. What do you think of these statements?

Manuel: We carry out sabotage against oil pipelines and some against the economy as a strategic tool of our actions. We are not crazy, of course, we do not hate foreigners; what we have said and want to demonstrate is that the gringos are stealing the oil, and not only the oil, but also the nickel, part of the gold, coal, and other natural resources. In addition, the country's ruling class kneels before these interests and allows this theft.

We didn't invent these claims; the country has known about them for more than 70 years. One only has to read the books of Jorge Villegas, and people close to the bourgeoisie, from the bourgeoisie itself, and scholars of Colombian reality also say the same thing.

Therefore, our assertion that the oil is being stolen is nothing new; what is new in our message is that we are accompanying it with acts of sabotage, that we are preventing the theft of oil with concrete actions, we are demanding that the oil policy be discussed, and we are showing possible solutions; but we are also stating that if the situation is not resolved, we will prevent the continued theft of our natural resources by force.

Of course, we are not claiming at any time that contracts with other countries or foreign companies are not necessary or that they cannot be made. We are aware that, as a developing country, we are not self-sufficient in either technology or financial resources, but we believe it is possible to develop a nationalist and sovereign policy and establish a contracting regime that provides benefits to the nation, to the vast majority of the country's population, and to the communities living in the areas where natural resources are extracted.

PCV: In exchange for what would the UCELN stop sabotaging the foreign companies operating in Colombia?

Manuel: In exchange for a policy of nationalizing our natural resources and for establishing sovereign contracts for the exploitation and commercialization of our natural resources.

PCV: Finally, I would like to bring up some statements made by the Army Commander, General Gustavo Arias Cabrales, on May 17, where he suggests that you, in particular, don't care about the country's wealth because you are a foreigner. What is your opinion on this?

Manuel: First of all, the problem is not about Manuel Pérez, nor is it because I am a foreigner. The problem for them is that we are defending a policy, which is not only the UCELN's policy, since various sectors of the population agree with it, and this policy is contrary to the one led by the Colombian oligarchy with the military and the Americans. The oligarchy that gives away the natural resources, the military that defends that giveaway, and the Americans who take the oil.

Secondly, I don't feel like a foreigner. I have been part of the Colombian people for 21 years, defending a policy and interests that arise from the needs of the people. Therefore, what they are attacking in me is precisely my ideas, not the place where I was born; what one chooses are their ideas, not the place where they are born, and according to those ideas, one acts within certain class interests.